## Democracy QPQ

### **2NC – Perm Fails**

#### **Unconditional security assistance fails – it rewards bad behavior and is treated as entitlement**

Adams and Sokolsky 15, 6-22-15, Gordon Adams – IR Professor @ Stanford University, Richard Sokolsky – Secretary of State's Policy Planning Staff, “Good Money After Bad: Time to Overhaul U.S. Security Assistance”, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2015/07/22/good-money-after-bad-time-to-overhaul-u-s-security-assistance//tyei

The United States has made security assistance and security cooperation a centerpiece of its global engagement. Security, U.S. leaders often argue, should come first in coping with such challenges as terrorism and insurgencies. However, U.S. security assistance programs routinely fail to achieve their goals, in part because they are too small, reward “bad behavior,” are treated as an entitlement and, most importantly, do not recognize the critical link between security and governance.

PATHOLOGIES

There are four major deficiencies in U.S. security sector assistance:

Small amounts of assistance go to too many countries to make a difference or provide leverage. The U.S. State Department’s FY2016 budget provides $8 billion for the security sectors of over 130 countries. More than three quarters of these funds are “earmarked” for Israel, Egypt, Colombia, and Jordan and half of the remaining countries receive roughly $2 million each.

Programs throw good money after bad, rewarding “bad behavior,” including corruption and coups. This is especially true for assistance to some of the world’s most poorly governed countries. The target should be states that can actually achieve positive results with U.S. funding.

Too many countries treat our assistance as an entitlement. Over the last decade, the overwhelming majority of countries receiving foreign military financing (FMF) were allocated roughly the same amount of funds each year, regardless of security sector performance or security outcomes. Moral hazard results: If a government receives funds regardless of performance, it has little incentive to seek results.

The measurements the United States makes of country performance and results focus on inputs, not outcomes. Over the past several years, according to the Fund for Peace, the security scores of almost all recipients of U.S. security assistance worsened slightly from what they had been before the investments started.

A NEW PARADIGM

Fundamentally, U.S. security assistance programs promote failure by putting the security cart before the governance horse; however, as a growing body of research suggests, “governance before security,” should drive U.S. policy.

To realign U.S. security assistance programs more closely with governance objectives, U.S. officials can take a lesson from the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC). MCC assistance is more selective and conditional than traditional assistance. It requires potential recipients to measure up to 16 indicators of good governance before they are eligible for an MCC “compact.”

Because MCC funds are limited and the program is highly selective, prospective MCC partners are, in effect, challenged to compete for funding with other countries on the basis of governance performance. Once countries sign a compact, the MCC applies stringent performance and evaluation controls to monitor and hold MCC partners accountable for results. Poor country performance in meeting commitments under their compacts can and has been penalized by the termination of the compact. In sum, MCC countries are incentivized to improve their policy performance to meet standards that both improve governance and advance U.S. national objectives.

The MCC experience offers a useful model for U.S. security assistance programs. Broader governance criteria, as well as criteria specifically related to security sector behavior, would determine the initial eligibility of countries for assistance. The United States would establish a “challenge fund” consisting of the bulk of U.S. security assistance funds for which potential recipient countries could compete. To be successful, the stewards of this fund would need to establish stringent performance standards both for overall governance and security sector performance competing countries would have to meet before they are declared eligible and selected for participation in the fund. For example, governments should:

* Be committed to civilian-led accountable institutions and have a military that only acts under civilian command and with clear and transparent rules of engagement;
* Make military/security capabilities, budget data, and weapons procurement transparent to civilian authorities and not allow the military to own productive resources in the civilian economy;
* Require military/security training to include human rights, accountability to civilians and civilian institutions, and adherence to rule of law and prohibit military/security forces from detaining individuals indefinitely or without trial;
* Have defense and interior ministries headed by civilians appointed through an accountable process, with low measures of corruption, as MCC uses;
* Have legislatures with capacity for effective oversight of military/security ministries and with budget/appropriations role for these budgets;
* Have a free press allowed to scrutinize and report on military and security force budgets and activities without repression;
* Have clear rules of engagement for dealing with internal unrest that meet international standards and do not use military/security forces for internal political repression; and
* Make an adequate investment of resources for training in the areas of democratic and community-oriented policing and have an investigatory framework that does not rely on torture and forced confession.

#### The AFF fails to reconcile policy disagreements that conditions solve – especially with authoritarian allies

* Could also be used for turns case?

Melissa Dalton 16, July 2016, assistance secretary of defense for homeland defense and America’s security affairs in the Biden Administration, senior fellow and deputy director of the Center for Strategic and International Studies, manager of the Nuclear Posture Review, M.A. in international relations from the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins University, B.A. in foreign affairs from the University of Virginia, https://csis-website-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/publication/160706\_Dalton\_SmartConditions\_Web.pdf//tyei

The complexity of global challenges ranging from China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea to transnational terrorism, weapons of mass destruction proliferation, and cyber threats will require the United States to partner with countries around the world to achieve common security objectives. In support of this approach, partners will require assistance from the United States in building the capacity and capabilities of their security forces and to improve interoperability with U.S. forces. However, inevitably, policy disagreements and clashing interests will arise between the United States and its security partners, and the United States will have to find ways to reconcile its security objectives and its broader foreign policy goals. Smart and strategic use of conditions on security assistance, when the United States has leverage in a security relationship, may help close these policy gaps. Assessing donor and recipient vulnerability at the front end of U.S. policy deliberations can help calculate leverage and determine the right kind of conditions that should be applied. Smarter use of conditions will not completely resolve the tensions in U.S. foreign policy, particularly when it comes to dealing with authoritarian regimes that the United States relies upon to achieve its security objectives. Broader and deeper policy research and discussion is needed on navigating the nexus of U.S. security and human rights objectives. In the meantime, and to further that evolution, the United States should adopt a set of guiding principles for conditions on security assistance to improve the consistency and credibility of its foreign policy

### 2NC – Say Yes

#### Positive conditionality is effective – especially for intel-sharing and defense cooperation

Tommy Ross and Melissa Dalton 20, 1-17-20, Tommy Ross, Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development, and Acquisition, Rormer Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Security Cooperation in the Office of the Secretary of Defense for Policy, Melissa Griffin Dalton, assistance secretary of defense for homeland defense and America’s security affairs in the Biden Administration, senior fellow and deputy director of the Center for Strategic and International Studies, manager of the Nuclear Posture Review, M.A. in international relations from the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins University, B.A. in foreign affairs from the University of Virginia, https://warontherocks.com/2020/01/a-roadmap-for-better-choices-from-security-partners//tyei

The United States should develop a framework for positive conditionality in security sector assistance to better shape political and security outcomes with partner countries. On balance an affirmative framework will offer the United States the widest latitude in shaping outcomes in a broad range of circumstances. This approach also does not rule out the sequencing of punitive steps — or a pause to assess partner performance.

First, this framework assumes an ex ante/positive approach to conditionality, at least in some manner. With the U.S. government providing security sector assistance to nearly 200 countries around the world, it is unlikely that the United States will be initiating a security sector assistance relationship wholly from scratch. An ex ante approach would focus on developing concrete plans, including triggers for clearly identified conditions, at the inception of an initiative or set of programs. It should involve a plan covering at least five years, identifying ultimate objectives and intermediate milestones, a theory of change for how objectives will be achieved, and metrics to provide a basis for assessing progress. Policymakers and planners can then link conditions to milestones and metrics. Moreover, such an approach builds on recognized best practices for capacity-building initiatives.

Second, the framework must include a partner government’s mutual participation in the creation of the assistance plan, the identification of objectives, and the agreement on conditions. The partner will be more incentivized to progress toward objectives when it understands and commits to such objectives based on its own identified interests. A memorandum of understanding, bilateral compact, or some other formal written instrument can commit both parties to its terms.

Third, the framework should structure conditions as positive inducements for the recipient to take steps toward milestones or objectives. Milestones could include completion of defense institutional reforms, starting with development of a process to align budget to strategy, progressing to completion of a first budget cycle with the new process, and culminating in institutionalization of the process through policy and/or law. They might also include progress toward capability or interoperability milestones (e.g., ability to conduct nighttime counter-terrorism operations in accordance with the laws of armed conflict or command and control and intelligence integration across platforms and systems). In addition, milestones could include transparency and accountability activities (e.g., publication of public budget, completion of audit, investigation of specific incidents of resource waste and abuse or diversion, establishment and activity of an independent third-party investigative unit for accountability).

Partners will likely respond to inducements that are material in nature, including access to an expanded variety of types of assistance and an expanded quantity of assistance. However, partners may also value incentives such as eligibility for key agreements to facilitate access and information and/or technology sharing (e.g., acquisition and cross-servicing, general security of military information, etc.) or eligibility for expanded partnership opportunities (e.g., National Guard State Partnership Program or the Military Personnel Exchange Program). Moreover, incentives may also be political, such as access to membership in certain organizations or eligibility for certain agreements.

### 2NC – Net Ben – I/L

#### Conditioning allies solves – spurs behavior change and causes positive demonstration effects

Melissa Dalton 16, July 2016, assistance secretary of defense for homeland defense and America’s security affairs in the Biden Administration, senior fellow and deputy director of the Center for Strategic and International Studies, manager of the Nuclear Posture Review, M.A. in international relations from the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins University, B.A. in foreign affairs from the University of Virginia, “Smart Conditions: A Strategic Framework for Leveraging Security Assistance”, https://csis-website-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/publication/160706\_Dalton\_SmartConditions\_Web.pdf//tyei

The United States provides security assistance to international partners as a means to achieve its foreign policy and supporting defense objectives. These objectives include developing partner nations’ military capabilities to enable them to control territory, building interoperability with U.S. forces, and securing peacetime and contingency access to critical air, land, and sea nodes. 1 Security assistance also aims to deepen political and military relationships that can advance the U.S. foreign policy agenda. The outcomes and second order effects of security assistance cannot be easily separated from policy or politics, because they influence the partner country’s monopoly on the use of violence and thus its cohesion as a state.2

As a result, when the policies of countries receiving U.S. security assistance fundamentally diverge from U.S. interests, the United States faces a dilemma. If it cuts off assistance to demonstrate American displeasure, it may risk losing leverage in working with the partner on other security objectives or broader foreign policy priorities, although that leverage may be ill-defined or overstated. On the other hand, if the United States ignores the policy divergence, it may lose credibility with the partner, as it then becomes difficult to reasonably press for reform while continuing assistance flows. It may also diminish perceptions of U.S. moral leadership, thereby also putting wider U.S. foreign policy objectives at risk in that country as well as internationally. Security services are often the tool of authoritarian governments, and U.S. support for those security services can enable them to continue repressive tactics and reinforce perceptions that the United States is willing to choose a security relationship over the well-being and rights of a country’s citizens.

Conditioning security assistance may provide a middle ground with associated benefits, costs, and implementation challenges. Conditionality aims to leverage partners’ reliance on U.S. aid to incentivize them to take certain steps to reform their behavior and better align their policies with U.S. interests and objectives. Conditioning assistance might also provide positive demonstration effects to curb bad behavior among other foreign partners that are observing Washington’s response as an indication of how far U.S. tolerance may stretch. Interestingly, some empirical research shows that unconditional military aid recipients are less likely than other states to align policies with U.S. preferences.3